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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1996, regulators in virtually every industrialized nation
started down the path of mandating that the incumbent telecommunications
operator offer competitors access to its network at regulated prices that
reflect the forward-looking cost of the network, rather than the incumbent's
historic cost. In the United States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
requires that incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) provide certain
elements of their networks to competitive local exchange carriers
(CLECs).' Most prominent among these elements is the local loop (the
connection between a subscriber and a telephone company's local switch).
The Telecommunications Act requires that these network elements be
priced at cost, with the possible addition of a reasonable profit. 2 In August
1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued rules for
determining these prices.3 The agency invented the concept of total element
long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) and made it the foundation for the
rules for pricing mandatory access to unbundled network elements. The
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996 tit. I, § 101(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (2000).
2. Id. at § 252(d)(1).
3. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) [hereinafter
FirstReport and Order].
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FCC's rules were based on a model of a hypothetical carrier that places
switches in the ILEC's existing switch locations but otherwise builds an
entirely new network to serve customer locations: "[t]he total element longrun incremental cost of an element should be measured based on the use of
the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and
the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the
incumbent LEC's wire centers." 4 The FCC's objective in establishing this
rule was unexceptionable: to determine the "incremental costs that
incumbents actually expect to incur in making network elements available
to new entrants" 5 and to adopt a pricing methodology that "best
6 replicates,
market.",
competitive
a
of
conditions
the
possible,
extent
the
to
To say that the FCC's pricing rules proved to be controversial both in
theory and practice would be an understatement. Between 1999 and 2002,8
the Supreme Court twice interpreted the rules for mandatory unbundling
and thereafter issued two more decisions in 2004 and 2007 construing the
relationship of antitrust law to this new regulatory regime. 9 Much of the
theoretical debate has focused on establishing proper cost of capital and
depreciation values that reflect the risk facing firms owning substantial
amounts of capital assets that become sunk upon deployment.' ° Certain
4. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2008).
5. FirstReport and Order,supra note 3, at para. 685.
6. Id.at para. 679.
7. Indeed, as we explain in more detail below, although the U.S. Supreme Court in
2002 ultimately upheld the FCC's authority to establish the TELRIC rules, in 2003, the FCC
opened an investigation to reform those rules to (1) make them align more realistically with
the underlying costs that telecommunications networks entail and (2) better promote
facilities-based competition. See Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of
Services by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 18945 (2003).
8. For a detailed critique of the FCC's pricing of unbundled network elements in the
First Report and Order, see J.Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081 (1997). These pricing rules,
along with numerous other parts of the FCC's interconnection rules, were almost
immediately challenged by ILECs and a number of state regulators. In July 1997, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned the FCC's pricing rules on the grounds
that the states, rather than the FCC, had jurisdiction over pricing. Iowa Utils. Bd.v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753, 794-96 (8th Cir. 1997). In January 1999, the Supreme Court modified the
Eighth Circuit's decision, upholding the FCC's authority to establish pricing rules (which
are implemented by the states), but not ruling on the merits of the rules themselves. AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 368 (1999). In May 2002, the Court ultimately ruled
that the FCC's pricing approach was a lawful interpretation of the (ambiguous) pricing
provisions for unbundled network elements contained in the Telecommunications Act.
Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 468 (2002).
9. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
10. See Jerry A. Hausman, Regulated Costs and Prices in Telecommunications, in 2
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components of modem telecommunications networks typically experience
steady decreases in equipment prices because of technological progress.
For example, the network operator usually can replace a switch or a piece
of fiber optic electronic equipment for less than its original purchase price,
yet maintain comparable quality and capabilities. The theoretical literature
explains how levelized annual cost calculations, widely used by U.S.
regulators, can produce economically incorrect cost estimates in these
circumstances.
This article describes another potential source of error in estimating
the economic costs of network elements-an error that, despite its great
practical significance, has elicited no commentary and evidently has caught
regulators around the world unaware. The cost models that regulators use
in practice typically require detailed estimates of the equipment and
installation prices of the numerous components that are used in a
telecommunications network. To represent and estimate the cost of local
loop facilities, these models estimate the quantities of components-such
as miles or kilometers of copper cable-as well as the purchase and
installation prices for these components. Consequently, when there is
uncertainty about how these prices will change over the period for which
costs and prices are required, the resulting cost estimates used for setting
the regulated prices of unbundled network elements can be very
inaccurate." Similarly, when regulators in other jurisdictions are
considering such rates as "benchmarks," it is necessary to make
adjustments to account for such large differences in critical input prices so
that the benchmark rates will be representative of the costs that will be
incurred by efficient carriers offering unbundled elements in those
jurisdictions.
The precipitous rise in the price of copper since 2003 exemplifies this
need to reevaluate the inputs used by regulators in their cost model, as well
as the inferences drawn from those models. 12 The large increases in copper
199 (Gary Madden ed., 2003); Jerry A. Hausman,
Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTrviY, MICROECONOMICS: 1997, 1 (Clifford Winston et al. eds.,
1997); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its
Purpose? EmpiricalEvidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECoN. 173, 195
(2005); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 462-63
(1999); Robert Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom
Networks, 6 REv. NETWORK ECON. 274, 274-75 (2007).
11. Typically, the cost models used in regulatory proceedings essentially ignore such
potential outcomes and instead implicitly assume that input prices will remain the same for
the foreseeable future.
12. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Commodities' Relentless Surge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at CI ("The price of copper has tripled in five years.... The biggest single factor
increasing commodity prices is China's rush to construct factories, other buildings and roads
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS,
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prices differ from the type of constant annual expected input price growth
(or decline) situation that some cost models used outside the United States
have accommodated with "tilted annuity" methods. Rather than a gradual
anticipated price increase, copper prices escalated rapidly and are likely to
remain well above the levels that regulators used to set existing loop rates.
The global financial crisis that began in the summer of 2008 does not
change the fundamental point that we raise. The price of copper fell sharply
in mid-2008; yet, as of this writing, that price is still roughly twice the level
that is built into the regulatory models. Indeed, this wide fluctuation in the
price of copper demonstrates why the use of a fictitious network with
current prices introduces a great amount of variability into the prices.
Should a regulator change regulated rates each time the price of copper
changes? Can a network provider or access seeker do rational business
planning when facing this amount of variability?
Part 11 of this article explains the data that TELRIC models require if
they are to achieve their purpose of producing valid estimates of the
forward-looking cost of an efficient telecommunications network. Part Ill
documents the rapid rise in copper prices since 2003 and how accounting
for such evidence would change the forward-looking costs of a
hypothetically efficient ILEC network that one of the most prominent U.S.
state regulatory commissions-the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC)--established in 2006.13 Part IV explains how the Commerce
Commission in New Zealand has similarly employed a benchmarking
methodology for the pricing
of unbundled loops that fails to account for the
14
increased price of copper.
Part V asks whether a global trend is emerging among
telecommunications regulators to ignore the input requirements of their
own forward-looking cost models. Such a trend would be consistent with a
version of regulatory opportunism in which regulators are forward-looking
only when doing so produces lower regulated prices over time. The risk of
to satisfy a growing, increasingly middle-class urban population with a taste for cars and
other consumer goods.").
13. Establishing Unbundled Network Element Rates and Price Floors for Verizon
California, Rulemaking 93-04-003, Decision 06-03-025 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Mar. 15,
2006), availableat http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/Finaldecision/54579.htm [hereinafter
Decision 06-03-025]. Because of the time taken to render the decision, the circa 2003
evidentiary record for copper cable prices had been outdated by the rapid increase in prices
that followed.
14. Draft Standard Terms Determination for the Designated Service Telecom's
Unbundled Copper Local Loop Network, Decision 609 (N.Z. Commerce Comm'n proposed
July 31, 2007) [hereinafter InitialDecision 609], replacedby Standard Terms Determination
for the Designated Service Telecom's Unbundled Copper Local Loop Network Backhaul
(Telephone Exchange to Interconnect Point), Decision 626 (N.Z. Commerce Comm'n June
27, 2008).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

regulatory opportunism and the high price of copper together create a
strong incentive for an ILEC to replace its copper loops with optical fiber.
Although some CLECs could be adversely affected by such a
decommissioning of copper loops, an ILEC has no duty under U.S.
antitrust or telecommunications law to keep copper loops in service for the
benefit of its competitors.
II. THE DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR FORWARD-LOOKING COST
MODELS
To attain the FCC's objective for TELRIC of determining
"incremental costs that incumbents actually expect to incur in making
network elements available to new entrants,"' 5 the results produced by the
TELRIC process must be consistent with the forward-looking business
decisions that those incumbents make in designing the network that
produces both the network elements provided on a wholesale basis and the
incumbent's retail services. 16 In competitive markets, such investments are
made with the expectation that prices will be sufficient to recover the
investments in long-lived assets (typically with "lumpy" capacities over
their economic lifetime) to earn a normal return, and to recover the
associated direct expenses along with some portion of the joint and
common costs of the enterprise.' 7 The competitive prices that are the basis
for such decisions are also the economically efficient rates for any
unbundled elements provided to other carriers.
Accordingly, evaluating whether the results produced by TELRIC
approximate such efficient prices involves an assessment of the extent to
which the TELRIC assumptions that constrain the network design to
existing switch locations-but otherwise assume that the network operator
has complete freedom to design a new network instantaneously-depart
from the economic decisions that produce real networks. In fact, previous
15. FirstReport and Order,supra note 3, at para. 685.

16. Id.
at para. 679.
17. In particular, Baumol and Sidak observe:
In recovering the cost of a lumpy plant over its lifetime, the payments should
be timed as they are in any competitive market. Thus, the sum of the revenues
over the lifetime of the investment should be sufficient to cover all costs,
including replacement of the investment when the time arrives, and the cost of the
capital tied up in the investment during its lifetime. This fundamental relationship
means that the discounted present value of these revenues must constitute a sum
equal to the discounted present value of the costs. The timing of the realization of
these revenues, however, cannot be determined definitively by the regulatory
agency-or by the courts or the firm's management, for that matter. The timing
ultimately is affected, if not entirely determined, by the state of the market at
different periods during the lifetime of the investment.
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity
Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383, 389-90 (2002).

Number 1]

FOR WARD-LOOKING REGULATORS?

analyses have identified at least
two significant ways in which the TELRIC
18
process departs from reality.
First, because of the long lives of network assets and the fact that
demand can change over both space and time, network components are
built over time, not instantaneously. Second, investments in assets with
long lives are made in the face of uncertainty about output prices and
volumes, input prices, and interest rates. Therefore, these departures from
reality imply that the costs and rates produced by the TELRIC process will
differ-potentially substantially-from economic costs and prices.' 9
A simple example of the bias introduced by the first factor is that the
routing of loop facilities from switches to customer locations is very likely
longer in the real world than what typical cost models based on TELRIC
produce, because the network was built to accommodate customer
locations as they evolved (e.g., to new subdivisions of housing) rather than
instantaneously. 20 As a result, real routes would require more cables and
18. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN

THE UNITED STATES 403-26 (1997); Graeme Guthrie, Regulating Infrastructure:The Impact
on Risk and Investment, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 925 (2006); Hausman, Regulated Costs and Prices
in Telecommunications, supra note 10; Timothy J. Tardiff, Pricing Unbundled Network
Elements and the FCC's TELRIC Rule: Economic and Modeling Issues, 1 REv. NETWORK
ECON. 132 (2002).
19. For example, Lehman and Weisman ask how much such hypothetical costs differ
from embedded costs-the actual operating costs to run a network of varying vintages of
equipment, valued at the prices paid for equipment when purchased. DALE E. LEHMAN &
DENNIS WEISMAN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: THE "COSTS" OF MANAGED

COMPETITION (2000). Based on simulations of embedded and hypothetical costs over a longrun period, they produce ranges within which cost differences should fall. The ranges that
they produce are generally smaller than the differences between embedded costs and rates
adopted by regulators, suggesting that other factors (e.g., inputs such as equipment prices,
cost of capital, and depreciation rates) explain the generally lower levels of unbundled
network element (UNE) rates that regulators adopt. There is one special case under which
the TELRIC assumptions could overstate costs (apart from using upwardly biased input
prices). If the price of an asset is expected to increase over time (e.g., at 2% annually), then
properly representing economic depreciation will result in costs that are lower than those
produced by TELRIC's implicit assumption of constant input prices in the early years, but
higher prices later. See, e.g., David M. Mandy & William W. Sharkey, Dynamic Pricingand
Investment from Static Proxy Models, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 403 (2003). Such an effect
would be offset by the cost increases associated with accommodating uncertainty.
20. In fact, the FCC acknowledged that its original conception of TELRIC is likely to
be unrealistic in this regard when it tentatively concluded in 2003 that TELRIC should be
revised to "more closely account for the real-world attributes of the routing and topography
of an incumbent's network in the development of forward-looking costs." Pricing of
Unbundled Network Elements and Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 18945, para. 52 (Sept. 15, 2003).
Although the FCC announced this conclusion in 2003, as of October 2007, the agency had
yet to complete its proceeding on the reform of the TELRIC process. Consequently, as of
late 2008, it remains the case that U.S. unbundled element prices are still based on flaws that
the FCC considers serious enough to require fixing.
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support structures because of their greater length. 2 1 Hausman 22 and
Pindyck 23 have identified the downward biases associated with the fact that
TELRIC models ignore the uncertainty under which real network
investments are made. A consequence of these biases is that the TELRIC
process will likely produce regulated rates for network elements that are
lower than economic costs, even when all input prices are measured
correctly.
III. COPPER PRICES AND THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION
In a recent proceeding in California to establish prices for unbundled
local loops, a witness for CLECs intending to lease local loops and other
unbundled network elements observed that copper prices had declined by
31% between the passage of the Telecommunications Act in 1996 and the
end of 2002.4 The implication was that the cost of local loops, for which
copper cables are a substantial component, should be expected to decrease
as well. In fact, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
approved new local loop rates in March 2006 using copper cable inputs
from 2003.25 Those 2003 prices turn out to be the low point of recent
copper prices, as shown in Figure 1.26 Even after the sharp decline in
copper prices in mid-2008, those prices were still substantially higher than
prices in 2003.

21. The shorter distance in a TELRIC model can be viewed as an artificial efficiency
improvement. That is, the "production process" implied by TELRIC produces the same
outputs (such as loops to customer locations) with fewer inputs. In principle, these artificial
efficiencies could be mitigated by using higher rates of economic depreciation, but this
adjustment would be difficult to implement in practice. Similarly, TELRIC models
understate costs to the extent that they fail to anticipate that future regulatory proceedings
may produce even lower rates, based on even more "efficient" hypothetical networks. See
Guthrie, supra note 18, at 936.
22. Hausman, Regulated Costs andPrices in Telecommunications, supra note 10.
23. Pindyck, supra note 10.
24. Declaration of John C. Klick in Support of Opening Comments of Joint
Commentors at para. 22, Open Access and Network Architecture Development of Dominant
Carrier Networks, Invest. 93-04-002 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 3, 2003) (on file with
the FederalCommunicationsLaw Journal).
25. Decision 06-03-025, supra note 13.

26. Prices for November 6, 1998 through November 6, 2008 are Copper Grade A cash
buyer prices reported by LME. See London Metal Exchange, Copper, Price graphs,
http://www.lme.co.uk/coppergraphs.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
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Figure 1: Copper Prices
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Contrary to the suggestion that copper prices were on a constant
downward trend, which would justify lower local loop prices in future
years, copper price almost immediately began to increase in 2003, and by
late 2007 were more than four times their 2003 level. Such an increase
would have a noticeable impact on the regulated rate for an unbundled
local loop.
Adjusting previously calculated unbundled element costs and rates for
major changes in input prices proceeds as follows. In the United States,
models that have been used to produce costs and rates for unbundled local
loops typically depict such loops as consisting of the following basic
components: (1) a copper drop wire (and associated equipment at the
customer's end of the loop); (2) copper distribution cable connecting the
drop wire to a cross-connect facility; (3) fiber or copper cable between the
cross-connect and the telephone company's switch; (4) for fiber-fed loops,
electronics that convert analog into digital signals; (5) support structures,
such as telephone poles and buried trenches over which cables are routed;
and (6) installation labor.
These cost models derive unit costs by: (1) estimating the quantities
of equipment needed to serve end users (e.g., lengths of copper cables of
various sizes, number of telephone poles, etc.) as well as the associated
labor cost for installing that equipment; (2) deriving the total investment
associated with the equipment and its installation by multiplying quantities
by current unit input prices (e.g., the price per foot for 25-pair copper
cable); (3) converting investments into annual (or monthly) capital costs
necessary to recover the initial investments, pay the associated income
taxes, and earn a return on those investments over the economic lives of the
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assets; (4) adding the annual direct costs (e.g., maintenance) and some
portion of shared and common costs; and (5) dividing the result by the
number of units expected to be in service.
In the case of unbundled loops, if the price of a particular input
changes and the other prices remain constant, the resulting change in the
output price can be approximated as follows:

ALC=OLCx

(1-w)+ W+N

where ALC is the adjusted loop cost that results from the change in the
input price, OLC is the original loop cost, w is the proportion of total cost
accounted for by the input whose price has changed, Po is the input price
used to determine the original loop cost, and PN is the current price of the
input in question. This approximation ignores the possibility that, if a
particular input becomes more expensive, there may be some substitution
toward other inputs. For example, if the price of copper increases, it may
become economic to deploy more fiber in the feeder. In the particular
California outcome discussed (the effect of the quadrupling of copper
prices on unbundled loop costs and rates), this substitution effect is small.
Even at the lower prices, the model in question depicted a predominantly
fiber-fed network. Therefore, copper feeder accounts for very little of the
total investment in the loop.
Returning to the recent California example, copper cable accounted
for about 12% to 13% of total loop costs in the CPUC's calculations.
Therefore, increasing copper cable input prices by the factor of 4.4, the
amount that the spot market price for copper increased between June 2003
and June 2006, would increase the loop cost by a factor of 0.12 to 0.13 x
(4.4 - 1), or about 40% from US$14 to about US$19 to US$20.27 This
estimate assumes that the increase in the price of raw copper passes
through directly into the price of copper cable.28

27. Ideally, consistent with AT&T Communications of Illinois v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 349 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2003), had the CPUC chosen to update copper input prices,
other prices, such as depreciation and the cost of capital, would be updated to 2006 values as
well. However, because the very large increase in copper prices is very likely much larger in
magnitude than potential offsetting factors that would lower the loop cost, the loop costs
adopted by the CPUC were most likely immediately out-of-date and, consequently, would
no longer serve as a reliable benchmark for loop costs in other jurisdictions. Decision 06-03025, supra note 13.
28. For example, if the price of copper cable reflects other aspects of transforming raw
copper into ready-to-install cable (e.g., production, warehousing, and the like), then the cost
increase could differ from the trend in raw copper prices. If the price of cable increased by a
factor of 2.5 (rather than the 4.4 increase in the copper spot price), the change in the loop
price would be 0.12 to 0.13 x (2.5 - 1), or 18% to 20%.
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IV. COPPER PRICES AND THE NEW ZEALAND COMMERCE
COMMISSION
Although the record evidence upon which the CPUC's March 2006
decision did not account for the sharp increases in the market price of
copper in its forward-looking pricing of local loop unbundling (LLU), the
New Zealand Commerce Commission was explicitly presented and
erroneously ignored such evidence in 2007. To understand how the
Commerce Commission made that mistake, it is useful to examine first its
benchmarking methodology for setting prices for unbundled local loops.
A.

BiasedLLU Benchmark Estimates

In this section, we will assume that the Commerce Commission's
analysis is based on valid forward-looking data. The Commerce
Commission attempts to solve a well-posed problem in econometrics: given
the characteristics of local loops in New Zealand, what is the best
prediction using the available overseas data? Econometrics (or, more
generally, statistics) has developed a well-accepted procedure to answer
this question. Prediction based on a linear regression model, given the local
loop characteristics in question, yields the best linear unbiased predictor
(BLUP). Thus, if the models are restricted to be linear and unbiased,
prediction from a regression model is "best" in the sense that it minimizes
the variance of the prediction. 29 Econometricians typically limit
consideration to consistent unbiased estimation procedures because
unbiasedness means that the prediction has an expected error of zero. The
BLUP result follows directly from the Gauss-Markov theorem, the
fundamental theorem of regression, which has been known for over a
century.30 Thus, the correct procedure for the Commerce Commission to
employ in a benchmark approach is to estimate a regression model and use
it to predict the LLU prices, given the characteristics of local loops in New
Zealand or the particular geographic region in question.
However, the approach that the Commerce Commission used to
develop benchmark rates did not follow this correct approach. Instead, the
Commerce Commission used a series of bivariate analyses of "potential
comparators" to determine "the relationship between each particular
indicator and UCLL [unbundled copper local loop] rates., 31 This approach
leads to biased results because each bivariate regression suffers from the
omitted variable problem.

29. Of course, nonlinear transformations of the variables all fit within this category,
although sometimes consistency replaces unbiasedness.
30. See, e.g., HENRI THEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMETRICS 119, 124 (1971).
31. InitialDecision 609, supra note 14, at 97.
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Two examples demonstrate the omitted variable problem. Suppose
one wanted to predict the performance of an incoming student to the MIT
graduate economics program. If one used a bivariate regression of actual
student performance and the student's score on the Graduate Record Exam
(GRE) economics section, one would find a positive relationship. However,
if instead, one used a multivariate regression model and included
undergraduate grade point average, performance on the GRE math exam,
and performance on the GRE economics exam, one would find no
significant relationship between the GRE economics exam score and
performance in the MIT graduate economics program. Indeed, MIT
economics admission disregards this variable-performance on the GRE
economics exam. If the other two variables are omitted, the GRE
economics exam result is found to be important, but that is because it is
positively correlated with the other two omitted variables. Conversely, if
one used a bivariate relationship to consider the effect of performance on
the GRE English exam on graduate student performance, one likely would
not find a relationship. However, if one included performance on the GRE
English exam with grade point average and performance on the GRE math
exam, one would likely find a positive and significant relationship. Thus,
using bivariate regression models leads to both kinds of errors: finding a
variable to be important when it is not important in a multivariate
relationship and finding a variable not to be important when it is important
in a multivariate relationship.
The Commerce Commission's approach for determining benchmark
rates is to consider a number of demographic and economic factors that
may be significant determinants of local loop costs so that they are
reflected in LLU rates. The Commerce Commission carried out a bivariate
regression analysis "to determine the relationship between each individual
comparability indicator and local loop rates. 3 2 This bivariate regression
analysis identified urban population and, less strongly, teledensity and
population density.33 These three variables were then used "to identify
countries comparable to New Zealand. 3 4 An arbitrary range for each of the
three variables was used to choose a sample of seven U.S. states, and
Australia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, for a total of eleven sample
observations. After converting the rates to New Zealand dollars, the
Commerce Commission used the median of the eleven observations of

32. Id. at 24.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 25.
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NZ$20.77.35 If the average was used instead, it would increase to
NZ$21.48.36
Taking a median (similar to an average) is an incorrect econometric
procedure. Only if the eleven observations were a random sample from a
population similar to New Zealand would unbiased results occur. However,
a table in the Commerce Commission's decisions strongly suggests that the
sample used violated this criterion." The median (and mean) of urban
population in the Commerce Commission data is 0.77, while for New
Zealand the urban population variable is 0.86.38 Because the Commerce
Commission found urban population to be the most important variable, the
Commerce Commission's approach is likely to generate a biased estimate
of LLU rates.
Sidak and Singer, whom the Commerce Commission references,
criticize the Irish regulator for using the mean of EU countries to set
Ireland's benchmark LLU rates.39 Sidak and Singer recommend using a
regression model as a superior approach to taking the sample mean. 40 In
Ireland, they found a downward bias of 42% because the regulator used the
sample average rather than the regression model prediction. 4'
B. Long-Term Benefits to End Users andDistortionof Investment
Incentives
Before turning to a regression analysis, we briefly examine the
Commerce Commission's consideration with regard to the criterion of
long-term benefits to end users. We do not agree with the economic
analysis underlying the decision. We begin with the observation that in
Canada and in many U.S. states, including California and a number of other
large states, local telephone rates have been deregulated (and/or subject to
much less stringent price controls)since 2006 or 2007.42 These jurisdictions
determined that deregulation was appropriate when cable-television-based

35. Id. at 30, tbl.6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 25, tbl.4.
38. The medians and means of the other two variables, teledensity and population
density, are relatively close. Id. at 25, tbl.4.
39. Id. at 23 (citing J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, How Can Regulators Set NonArbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland, 3 J. NETWORK
INDUS. 273 (2002)).
40. Sidak & Singer, supra note 39, at 289.
41. Id. at289-90.
42. For a discussion, see Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications
Regulation: CurrentApproaches with the End in Sight, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? (Nancy L. Rose, ed., forthcoming 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/books_inprogress/econ-reg/index.html.
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telephone service and cellular service competed with the landline carrier's
service.
Most economists agree that competition, rather than "regulation
forever," leads to better results for consumers. Thus, when the Commerce
Commission considers "additional incentives for access seekers to replicate
and bypass Telecom's local loop infrastructure" they are mistakenly
considering that an access seeker might decide to build a new copper-based
network.43 This outcome probably would never happen. The relevant
question is how low access rates affect the economic incentives to invest in
alternative technologies-e.g., a pay cable network that will
compete with
44
the landline network or new technologies such as WiMax.
Our academic research has determined that low LLU rates decrease
economic incentives for investment in alternative competing
technologies.4 5 Further, because LLU rates do not correctly account for the
sunk and irreversible nature of network investment, they are too low to
create incentives for efficient investment. 46 Because investors in competing
technologies (such as cable networks or WiMax networks) will be required
to take account of the sunk and irreversible nature of network investment,
the Commerce Commission's claim of possible "inefficient by-pass" is
incorrect.4 7 The Commerce Commission needs to consider competitive
outcomes in Canada and the United States as well as the investment
incentives and investment risks faced by potential competing network
providers in New Zealand.
Our previous research has also demonstrated that the incumbent's
investment is determined by its expected rate of return. This fact is
especially important in the current situation because most new investment
in telecommunications networks is sunk and irreversible. Indeed, the U.S.
experience demonstrates that the incumbents decided to invest in
residential fiber-optic networks once the FCC guaranteed that it would not
mandate that competitors have access to these new networks at uneconomic
rates artificially suppressed by regulation. Currently, Verizon and AT&T

43. Initial Decision609, supra note 14, at 28-29.
44. Sprint is currently building a WiMax network in the United States. See, e.g., Press
Release, Sprint Nextel and Samsung Electronics Corporation Ltd., Sprint and Samsung
Declare Mobile WiMax Technology Is Now Ready For Commercial Service (May 15,
2008), available at http://www2.sprint.com/mr/mrhome.do (follow "News Releases"
hyperlink, then follow hyperlink dated May 15, 2008).
45. See, e.g., Hausman & Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose?,
supra note 10.
46. See, e.g., Hausman, Regulated Costs and Prices in Telecommunications, supra note
10. We have discussed this point in numerous academic papers, and it has been accepted by
the FCC. See FirstReport and Order,supra note 3, at para. 687.
47. Initial Decision609, supra note 14, at 29-32.
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are investing in these new networks at a cost exceeding US$10 billion.48
Thus, to the extent that New Zealand will depend on its own incumbent,
Telecom New Zealand, to provide new technology requiring new
investment, it is important that the Commerce Commission-if it does not
forbear from mandating access to new networks entirely--establish
regulated rates for mandatory access that make this investment economic in
the sense of having a high enough expected rate of return.
C.

Benchmark Rates Predictedfrom a Regression Model

We now estimate a regression model where the left-hand side variable
is the logarithm (log) of price and the right-hand side variables are log of
population density, log of urban population, and log of teledensity. We do
not argue that this regression model should be used to determine LLU
benchmark prices, as the rates used in the model are not forward-looking.
Rather, the value of the model is to demonstrate the downward bias in the
Commerce Commission's approach.
Our first sample has 51 observations from U.S. states (and the District
of Columbia) that are contained in the Commerce Commission database.
We begin with U.S. states because they share a common technology arising
from the Bell System before 1984 and from Bellcore thereafter. The results
appear in Table 1.
Table 1: Log R ession Model: U.S. States
In llu nz
ln.popdensity
In urbanpop
n teledensity
cons

Coef.
-0.056
-0.229
-0.089
3.203

Number of obs.
R-squared
Root MSE

51.000
0.581
0.147

Std. Err.
0.023
0.083
0.077
0.154

T
-2.43
-2.75
-1.15
20.77

P>t[
0.02
0.01
0.26
0.00

48. Despite the fact that U.S. incumbents continue to make unbundled copper loops
available (or the equivalent functionality on fiber loops) after such upgrades are complete, a
number of competitors have requested that the FCC and U.S. state regulators not allow
incumbents to retire copper facilities. Such a perpetuation of copper facilities (especially if
unbundled loop prices have not been updated to reflect recent developments in world copper
markets) would harm the incentives of both incumbents and providers of competing
platforms to invest.
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Table 1 indicates that population density and urban population are
highly significant and that teledensity has the expected sign.49 The root
mean squared error (MSE) is 14.7%, and the R2 is 0.58; so the model has
good properties. Using the values for New Zealand given by the Commerce
Commission,50 the regression model predicts a median of NZ$23.61 with a
standard error prediction of 15.3%. This prediction is unbiased and is
13.7% higher than the Commerce Commission's median result. 5 1 Thus, we
conclude that the Commerce Commission's median rate is downwardly
biased by a statistically significant amount (at the 10% level).
We now consider another regression model that includes all the U.S.
states as well as the four additional countries used in the Commerce
Commission's analysis: Australia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The
results appear in Table 2.
Table 2: Log Regression Model: U.S. States Plus Australia,
Finland, Norwa , and Sweden
P>t
t
Std. Err.
Coef.
In flu nz
0.13
-1.52
0.020
-0.031
ln_popdensity
0.00
-3.88
0.078
-0.303
In urbanpop
0.05
-2.05
0.075
-0.154
In teledensity
0.00
22.71
0.133
3.013
cons
55.000
Number of obs
0.548
R-squared
0.154
Root MSE
The model does not fit quite as well as the previous model, as the root
MSE increases to 15.4%. Teledensity now becomes significant, while
population density is no longer significant. The median prediction for New
Zealand is now NZ$22.31, which is 7.4% higher than the Commerce
Commission's prediction.52 This result again demonstrates the bias in the
Commerce Commission's econometric approach. The standard error of the
prediction is 15.8%, which again demonstrates that the regression model
prediction has excellent properties.
We conclude that the Commerce Commission's approach to
estimating benchmark LLU rates for New Zealand does not follow
accepted econometric practice. Further, a regression model is able to give
quite precise predictions for New Zealand based on a sample of U.S. states
plus the foreign countries used by the Commerce Commission. The results
49. Although teledensity is not individually significant, it improves the predictive
power of the model.

50. InitialDecision609, supra note 14, tbl.3.
at 31, tbl.6.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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of the regression model demonstrate a downward bias in the Commerce
Commission's results, as Table 3 summarizes.
Table 3: Commerce Commission Estimate and Regression
Estimates
% Bias of Commerce
Commissionmet.
Median
Source of Estimate
Commission Est
CC Median Estimate
Regression Model U.S. States
Regression Model: U.S. + Foreign
D.

$20.77
$23.61
$22.31

--13.7%
7.4%

Benchmark Data That Are Not Forward-Looking

The Commerce Commission states that the LLU rates should be
forward-looking. 3 We agree. However, the data used by the Commerce
Commission to set benchmark rates are not forward-looking. Between 2001
and 2007, the price of copper increased by approximately 343 0/--from
US$1,578 per metric ton in 2001 to US$6,985 in 2007. 54 Although one of
the most significant costs of a local loop is the copper cable, this increased
price of copper is not reflected in the data upon which the Commerce
Commission relied. In this respect, the Commerce Commission's
benchmark data are not forward-looking, and that data consequently causes
downward bias in estimates of the forward-looking LLU price. Our
unbiased median estimate of the correct LLU price for New Zealand is
NZ$32.78, which is forward-looking because it takes account of the
increased price of copper. The Commerce Commission's estimate is not
forward-looking because it does not account for the increased price of
copper. Table 4 shows the LME yearly copper price from 2001 to 2007.
Table 4: Price of Copper, 2001-2007 (TJS$ per Metric Ton)
Year
Price
% Increase from 2001
2001
1,577.56
2002
1,557.88
-1.2%
2003
1,779.73
12.8%
2004
2,867.96
81.8%
2005
3,683.81
133.5%
2006
6,725.33
326.3%
2006
6,985.22
342.8%
Source: London Metal Exchange, series LCPCASH-US$.

53. Id. at 20-21.
54. Data contained in tbl.4.
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Because copper is a storable commodity, the current spot price is an
excellent estimate for the expected future price. Thus, no reason exists to
believe that the copper price will return to "normal" lower levels in the
future. It would be incorrect to take a long-run average for the copper price
given the economic factors that determine the price of copper. Even though
New Zealand's exchange rate may be subject to cyclical volatility, no
reason exists to believe that the world price of copper is subject to cyclical
volatility given its characteristic as a resource with an upward-sloping
cumulative supply curve over time. As Table 4 and Figure 1 indicate, the
price of copper has increased exponentially, driven largely by the growth of
the Chinese economy. Because of the current global financial crisis, the
price of copper has decreased, but it is still over twice as high as it was at
the time it was used in the New Zealand determination.5 5 A question' may
arise as to how regulation should take account of the "inaccuracy" of the
futures market prediction made in 2007. Academic research has
demonstrated that futures markets are the best predictors of future
commodity prices.56 While the predictions sometimes turn out to be high
(as now) they are often also low. No better predictor exists for future
prices, so the future price of copper should be incorporated into the
decision of estimating forward-looking cost.
We can now relate the decision of New Zealand's regulators in 2007
to that of California's regulators in 2006. We have analyzed 2003 data used
in the 2006 CPUC decision that adopted rates for local loops averaging
about US$14 for Verizon California. As noted earlier, if we use 2006
copper prices instead of 2003 levels, the resulting loop rate could have been
more than 40%. Copper cable accounted for about 12% of total loop
investment in the CPUC's calculations. Therefore, increasing copper cable
input prices by the factor of 4.4 that the spot market price for copper
increased between June 2003 and June 2006 would increase the loop cost
by about 40%, resulting in an estimate of about US$20 instead of US$14.
Is the increased price of copper reflected in the Commerce
Commission's benchmark data set? The share of copper cost in total LLU
cost, consistent with the CPUC's cost model, implies an estimated
coefficient in a log-log regression model of approximately 0.12. We took
the data set consisting of the U.S. states and three of the four other
countries 57 and put in the price of copper in the year of the decision, under

55. See supra p. 207 fig. 1.
56. See, e.g., Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, Commodity Future Prices: Some
Evidence on Forecast Power, Premiums, and the Theory of Storage, 60 J. Bus. 55 (1987).
57. We exclude Norway from the sample because we cannot tell on which year of data
the LLU price was based.
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the hypothesis that the LLU estimates are forward-looking, as required by
the Commerce Commission. The results are in Table 5.
Table 5: Log Regression Model with Copper Price
In flu nz
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>lt
lnpopdensity
-0.045
0.020
-2.22
0.03
In urbanpop
-0.238
0.079
-3.01
0.00
In teledensity
-0.139
0.072
-1.93
0.06
ln-coppermt
-0.202
0.091
-2.22
0.03
cons
4.782
0.794
6.02
0.00
Number of obs
54.000
R-squared
0.594
Root MSE
0.147
Contrary to the expectation that the estimated coefficient of the log
copper price should be positive and approximately 0.12, the regression
results find a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.202.
Thus, the Commerce Commission's sample of LLU prices does not
correctly reflect the exponential increase in the copper price during the
sample years. Instead, that sample demonstrates that regulators, at least in
the United States, continued to decrease the LLU rates over time to attempt
to encourage more competitive entry. 58 This attempt largely failed. Many
states, including California, have now deregulated local landline prices, as
competing technologies constrain the price of local telephone service.
Thus, the increased price of copper is not reflected in the data relied
on by the Commerce Commission. The Commission recognizes this
potential problem, as it concedes that "costs may evolve over time and
regulated rates may become outdated."5 9 However, the Commerce
Commission did no economic or econometric analysis to determine
whether the international rates it used reflected costs (i.e., copper prices)
that have, in fact, evolved over time. In particular, when one examines the
August 2006 decision of the Australian Competition & Consumer
Commission (ACCC) on LLU,6 ° which the Commerce Commission used in
its own estimate, one can find no reference to taking into account the
58. A regression model with a yearly indicator variable (rather than copper prices) finds
a monotonic decreasing LLU rate across years after controlling for the three variables used
in the regression specification. This finding is consistent with regulators decreasing LLU
rates over time to attempt to encourage more entry.
59. Initial Decision 609, supra note 14, at 21.
60. Assessment of Telstra's ULLS Monthly Charge Undertaking (Australian
Competition & Consumer Comm'n Aug. 28, 2006) (final decision), available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemld/759855/fromltemd/721622
(follow
"Final decision-Assessment of Telstra's ULLS monthly charge undertakings-August
2006.pdf' hyperlink).
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increased price of copper, which should be included in a forward-looking
price determination. Thus, the ACCC decision does not appear to be
forward-looking, contrary to the Commerce Commission's determination.
However, we note that Telstra, the incumbent network operator in
Australia, is well aware of the effect of the increased price of copper. In an
August 2006 submission to the ACCC, Telstra noted a 76% increase in the
prices of copper and brass and a 48.8% increase in the price of electric
cable and wire over the previous four years, using data from the Australian
Bureau of Statistics Web site. 6' The submission then estimated "implied
price escalators" for distribution conduit and trenching, main conduit and
trenching, distribution cable, and main cable.62 Each escalator exceeded
20% over the previous four-year period.63 Overall, Telstra's filing
estimated a 22.7% increase over the previous four years for the prices of
"composite for network assets." 4 This evidence--drawn from the
Australian government's own statistical sources-counsels the ACCC to
recheck the plausibility of its estimates of the forward-looking costs of
Telstra's network.
As it currently stands, the Australian data that the Commerce
Commission used in the New Zealand proceeding are not forward-looking.
They lead to downward bias in the estimates of the forward-looking LLU
price. The failure of regulated LLU rates to capture accurately the most
important input cost, other than labor, demonstrates that the benchmarking
approach cannot lead to accurate LLU estimates. However, to the extent
that the Commerce Commission must estimate benchmark LLU rates, we
suggest the Commerce Commission take the geometric average of the
regression model estimate, NZ$22.95, and then apply a 42.8% adjustment
factor using the LME copper price in June 2007, because the modal date
for the data is 2003. Using this copper adjustment factor leads to an
adjusted median estimate of NZ$32.78.6 5 Otherwise, the Commerce

61. Supporting Witness Statement, The Matter Undertakings Dated 23 December 2005
in Respect of Unconditioned Local Loop Service, para. 9 (Australian Competition &
Consumer Comm'n Aug. 21, 2006) (testimony provided by Telstra Corp. Ltd. on Price
Indices Supplement Statements), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/
itemld/771159/fromltemld/743667 (follow the "Price Indices Sup Statement (21 Aug
06).pdf' hyperlink) [hereinafter Telstra Corp. Price Indices Supplement Statements]. The
witness relied on information from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
62. Id. at para. 12.
63. Id.
64. Id. at para. 16.
65. The change in the copper price from June 2003 to June 2007 is used for the
adjustment. We make all adjustments using constant New Zealand dollars. Ideally, if data on
the change in the price of copper cable from 2003 to 2007 were available (e.g., from carriers
participating in the regulatory proceeding), a more refined adjustment to the benchmark
would result.
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Commission estimate will not be forward-looking because it will not
account for the increased price of copper.
E.

Subsequent Developments

In November 2007, the Commerce Commission issued a final version
of its draft decision on the UCLL.66 Unlike the draft decision, the final
decision used a stepwise regression to select the appropriate variables.6 7
However, stepwise regression is well-known to be an unreliable
econometric technique.68 Consequently, the bias that we found in the
Commerce Commission's initial results still affect its final results that use a
stepwise regression.
Furthermore, the Commerce Commission claimed in its final decision
that it could not consider the use of forward-looking copper costs due to the
constraints of the benchmarking process under an initial pricing principle
(IPP). 69 The Commerce Commission stated that the legislation requires the
Commission, at the IPP stage, to undertake "[b]enchmarking against prices
for similar services in comparable countries that use a forward looking
cost-based pricing method. ' 70 The Commerce Commission thus collects
data on rates for copper loops that overseas regulators have classified as
forward-looking cost-based access prices. But the Commerce Commission
evidently believes that it has neither an express legislative mandate nor any
inherent discretion to evaluate the accuracy of those overseas prices and
adjust the New Zealand price accordingly. If the overseas regulators have
erroneously labeled prices as being forward-looking when they are not, the
Commerce Commission evidently believes that it is powerless to avoid
repeating their errors at the IPP stage. The Commerce Commission
evidently believes that, if the increased price of copper does have the
impact that we find, that impact will be reflected in any subsequent
TELRIC modeling that will be done if either the access seeker or the access

66. Standard Terms Determination for the Designated Service Telecom's Unbundled
Copper Local Loop Network, Decision 609 (N.Z. Commerce Comm'n Nov. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Final Decision 609], available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz (enter 625260
into search field).
67. Id.at paras. 159-164. The final decision states: "Based on the corrected data set, the
Commission has adopted a general-to-specific approach, which starts from a comprehensive
model that includes all the variables that are expected to be relevant, and which then is
simplified by dropping insignificant variables in a step-wise manner." Id. at para. 159
(citation omitted).
68. See, e.g., PAUL A. RuuD, AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL ECONOMETRIC THEORY
236-37 (2000) ("the statistical properties of stepwise regression are intractable"); DAMODAR
N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 460 (3d ed. 1995).
69. FinalDecision 609, supra note 66, at para. 184.
70. Id. at para. 58 (quoting Telecommunications Act, 2001, schedule 1, part 2 (N.Z.)).
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provider requests a final pricing principle (FPP). 7 1 In short, the Commerce
Commission regards such adjustments under the terms of the legislation to
be more applicable to a FPP than an IPP.
As a matter of empirical reasoning, this explanation for neglecting
copper prices is unpersuasive. The Commerce Commission's final decision
states explicitly, as did its initial decision, that the methodology should be
forward-looking. It is a fact that fixed-line networks are based on copper
loops. It is a fact that the price of copper has increased significantly. Yet,
the Commerce Commission did not adjust the benchmarking results to
account for the increased price of copper.7 2 By definition, neglecting the
price of copper prevents the Commerce Commission's LLU prices from
being forward-looking. The Commerce Commission's methodology
produces no reliable economic information to support a regulatory
decision. Legal consequences properly follow. Depending on the
jurisdiction, such a result could be unlawful. The resulting regulation might
be characterized, by U.S. standards, as unsupported by the evidence, resting
on inadmissible "junk science," being arbitrary and capricious (Daubert
standard), being contrary to the statutory requirement that prices be
forward-looking, or even being confiscatory in violation of constitutional
protections of private property.
V. REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM AND THE FAILURE TO RECTIFY

THE KNOWN DEFICIENCIES OF TELRIC PRICING: THE ILEC's
RIGHT UNDER ANTITRUST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW TO
DECOMMISSION COPPER LOOPS
TELRIC pricing was originally adopted at a time when U.S.
regulators widely appeared to believe that unbundled elements would not
71. The Commission may also be concerned that its adjustment of loop prices in the
face of rising world copper prices would invite questions as to why it had not also adjusted
the forward-looking costs of trenching, labor, and other inputs associated with rebuilding the
local loop.
72. A similar situation has continued in Australia. In May 2008 both Telstra, the
network owner, and Optus, an access seeker, made submissions recommending that the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) take account of the higher
price of copper in its access price determination. See Telstra Corp. Ltd., Submission in
Response to the Commission's Draft, Unconditional Local Loop Service, Austl.
Competition and Consumer Comm'n (May 14 2008), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/
content/index.phtml/itemld/825161 (follow the "Telstra submission" hyperlink); Optus,
Submission on ULLS Pricing Principles and Indicative Prices, Austl. Competition and
Consumer Comm'n, (May 27, 2008) available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.pht
ml/itemld/825161 (follow the "Optus submission" hyperlink). The ACCC continued to
ignore the increase in copper prices in its decision. Austl. Competition and Consumer
Comm'n, Unconditional Local Loop Service: Pricing Principles and Indicative Prices, (June
2008) available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtmllitemld/825161 (follow the
"Final indicative prices and pricing principles for ULLS.pdf" hyperlink).
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only "jump start" competition, but also would be a major source of
competition by themselves. Accordingly, it is not surprising that regulators
have often regarded the growth in the number of competitors' lines as an
important measure of the success of competition policy, regardless of the
investments required to provide those lines.73 As a result of a circuitous
legal and regulatory path, greater emphasis on full facilities-based
competition-typically over platforms other than traditional copper
loops-is becoming increasingly prominent at the same time that
competition from providers reselling all or parts of incumbent networks has
receded. However, the regulatory reform of TELRIC pricing that would
naturally accompany this shift in direction has stalled. This and other
sources of regulatory lag have resulted in TELRIC prices that are still
based on a methodology that the FCC, its sponsor, has tentatively
concluded is in need of reform. Perhaps more important, extant values of
critical components such as unbundled loops are based on inputs that are
out of date because of the changes in copper prices and perhaps other
markets supplying telecommunications inputs.
With these developments, the challenge of developing economicallyproper regulated input prices (through either extensive cost studies or
benchmarking other jurisdictions) becomes increasingly difficult. Under
these circumstances, it is important that artificially low input prices not be
maintained by failure to adjust out-of-date costs in the hopes that they will
give the appearance of more competition, under the guise of greater
volumes supplied not by competitors investing in network technologies, but
by carriers that continue to resell the older technology of incumbent
providers.
Given the high price of copper, an ILEC faces a strong incentive to
replace its copper loops with fiber optic cable and then recycle the valuable
copper. The removal of copper loops from service, however, would
adversely affect CLECs that have built business models that rely on the
continued availability of copper loops. Consequently, the following
question arises as a matter of telecommunications or antitrust law: does the
ILEC have a duty to keep copper loops in service after they have been
replaced with fiber optic cable? Must the ILEC continue to offer unbundled

73. For example, during the time when the unbundled element platform (UNE-P) was
being offered in the United States, state regulators generally lowered its price. At its peakwhen the FCC was beginning to respond to court directives that ultimately ended the
availability of UNE-P at favorable regulated rates--over 60% of the competitive lines in the
U.S. were obtained at wholesale from the incumbents and involved no use of competing
network facilities. See, e.g., Timothy J. Tardiff, Changes in Industry Structure and
Technological Convergence: Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation in
Telecommunications, 4 INT'L ECON. & ECON. POL'Y 109 (2007), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/wg612681347lk809/.
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copper loops to CLECs at regulated prices and thus forgo the opportunity
to recycle that copper in the commodities markets? Under American law,
no such obligation exists.
Federal telecommunications law imposes no duty on the ILEC to keep
copper loops in service for the benefit of CLECs. To the contrary, section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes a duty on the FCC
that points in the opposite direction: the Commission "shall encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing . . .
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment., 74 "[A]dvanced telecommunications
capability" is a term of art that the Telecommunications Act defined to be
"high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that
enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics,
and video telecommunications using any technology. ' ' 75 The deployment of
fiber to the home (FTTH) or fiber to the curb (FTTC) and the concomitant
retirement of copper facilities lower an ILEC's costs of maintaining its
networks and enable the ILEC to provide a wider range of services to
compete with cable's triple-play bundles. That replacement of copper with
a superior infrastructure is also congruent with regulatory policy.
The FCC has clearly stated that an ILEC may decommission copper
wires when it has replaced them with alternate fiber facilities.76 The ILEC
must provide reasonable notice to the FCC, with an opportunity for CLECs
to comment.77 If the FCC takes no action in response to the ILEC's notice
of decommissioning, the ILEC may proceed to decommission the facilities
and scrap the copper.
Where the ILEC replaces existing mass-market copper facilities with
optical fiber, it must make a voice channel of the fiber available for
unbundled access. Thus, to the extent that CLECs currently serve
customers through an existing copper facility, they continue to have the
option to compel the ILEC to supply continuing access to voice UNEs.78 In
74. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. VII, § 706(a), 110 Stat.
56, 153 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note).
75. Id. § 706(c)(1).
76. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, para. 273 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Triennial Review],
rev'd in part, U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(5) (2000).
78. Recall that the purpose of mandatory unbundling in the United States under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (unlike its purpose in Europe) was to increase competition
in voice telephony, not broadband Internet access. See Hausman & Sidak, Did Mandatory
Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose?, supra note 10. Consequently, it is not relevant to the
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this respect, the ongoing ability of CLECs to compete in the supply of
voice service is thereby unimpaired. The Telecommunications Act,
however, does not give CLECs the right to freeze an existing technology
for providing access to the incumbent local exchange network. Where
optical fiber is not replacing existing copper facilities-i.e., in new
developments or where CLECs are not providing service-the ILEC may
retire redundant copper facilities without incurring new unbundling
duties.79
There is no indication that the FCC's procedures by which an ILEC
gives notice of its intent to remove copper loops from service compromises
the growth of facilities-based competition in telephony. The retirement of
copper loops is not impairing universal service or retarding broadband
deployment. To the contrary, retirement and redeployment of a valuable
but inefficiently used resource reflects an ILEC's powerful incentive to
transition its services to a next-generation platform. By deregulating
unbundled broadband elements following the early failures of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC removed regulatory distortions
that impeded true intermodal competition among different technology
platforms--cable, wireless, satellite, and LLECs. If, in contrast, an ILEC
were not permitted to retire its copper loops, it would be effectively forced
to maintain a duplicative network, replete with the costs of maintaining that
network. By scrapping its obsolete copper loops, the ILEC can invest its
resources into deploying a more powerful network of optical fiber.
American antitrust law supports the same conclusion. A CLEC might
argue that the ILEC's retirement of copper loops violates section 2 of the
Sherman Act.80 A court analyzing such a claim by a CLEC would look for
exclusionary or predatory behavior that would "reasonably appear[]
capable of making a significant contribution to [creating or] maintaining

legal analysis here whether or not a CLEC could provide DSL service over the voice
channel that the ILEC would make available after decommissioning a copper loop.
79. See, e.g., 2003 Triennial Review Order,supra note 76, para. 273. The D.C. Circuit
has also explained:
Specifically, the FCC did not require ILECs unbundle fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)
loops (i.e., loops extending from the ILEC's central office all the way to the
customers' premises) in places where fiber loop plant had not previously existed:
"greenfield" situations (i.e., new residential areas where no lines had existed) and
"overbuild" situations (i.e., locations where only copper loop plant was in place).
In the latter, however, if the ILEC decides to retire the incumbent copper loops, it
must then make its fiber loops available-albeit only for narrowband, not
broadband uses.
Earthlink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
80. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
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monopoly power.' '8' Under this theory, the elimination of copper loops
would cause the demise of certain CLECs.
But, that theory of liability is untenable both because the ILEC would
lack the requisite monopoly power and because the requisite
anticompetitive conduct would be absent. Even if one were to assume the
narrowest definition of the market in question-voice service-it is
implausible that ILECs exert monopoly power today.8 2 Competition from
cable companies and wireless companies effectively constrain ILECs from
raising retail prices for voice service. The fact that every Bell Operating
Company has received and retained approval under section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act to provide interLATA service within its state
confirms that these ILECs face effective competition within their local
exchange footprints. 83 Further confirmation of that fact is found in the
decision of many states to deregulate local telephone service.8 4 Given the
existence of pervasive facilities-based competition, the elimination of nonfacilities-based CLECs (which would be highly speculative given the
requirement to continue unbundling a voice channel where CLECs have
captured subscribers) would not harm consumer welfare. Finally, barriers
to entry no longer exist in light of the heavy investment in access networks
already made by cable, traditional phone, wireless (in WiMax), satellite,
and electric power companies. This evidence of facilities-based
competition and entry also makes the essential facilities doctrine
inapplicable. 5
Even if an ILEC were found to possess the requisite monopoly power,
liability could not follow because the conduct in question-the
decommissioning of copper loops--does not violate a monopolist's duty
under the Sherman Act. An ILEC's sale of scrapped loops on the world
copper market is not predatory within the framework of Brooke GroupLtd.
81. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc, per
curiam) (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, sec. 651 c (1996)).

82. See, e.g., Dennis W. Weisman, When Can Regulation Defer to Competition for
ConstrainingMarket Power?: Complements and Critical Elasticities,2 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 101 (2006); Dennis W. Weisman, Assessing MarketPower: The Trade-offBetween
Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation,1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 339

(2005).
83. See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004) ("To be allowed to enter the long-distance market in the first place, an incumbent
LEC must be on good behavior in its local market.").
84. See, e.g., Verizon Virginia Inc. and Verizon South Inc. - For a Determination that
Retail Services are Competitive and Deregulating and Detariffing of the Same, No. PUC2007-00008 (Commw. of Va. State Corp. Comm. Dec. 14, 2007) (order on application).
85. See Hausman & Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling
of Telecommunications Networks, supra note 10, at 467-71; Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J.

Gregory Sidak, EssentialFacilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
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v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.86 because no economic loss (or
even a profit sacrifice) would result from moving these assets to their
highest-valued use. An ILEC's retirement of copper loops does not require
it "to suffer losses today on the chance that it will reap supracompetitive
profits in the future."87 This conduct by the ILEC is rational in both the
short run and the long run, regardless of what happens to its competitors.
That conclusion necessarily follows from the fact that the regulated prices
of unbundled loops are likely to be materially below the true forwardlooking incremental cost of building a copper network (i.e., because such
prices are unlikely to account for the higher copper price.) Far from being
predatory or self-harming, an ILEC's decision to retire copper wires is an
exercise of sound business judgment that immediately increases the value
of the firm. The increased price of copper, coupled with the reluctance of
regulators to adjust TELRIC cost models accordingly, means that an ILEC
will capture profit-not sacrifice it-by substituting optical fiber for
copper.8 8 Thus, unlike the facility owner being sued on section 2 grounds in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,89 an ELEC
decommissioning copper loops could not be found "to forgo... short-run
benefits because it was more interested in reducing competition in the...
market over the long run by harming its smaller competitor." 90
A CLEC might cast an ILEC's scrapping of its copper loops as a
refusal to deal. The general rule, of course, is that even a monopolist may
refuse to deal. An ILEC's refusal to continue leasing copper loops would
not fall within Aspen Skiing's narrow exception to that general rule, for the
ILEC had no prior course of voluntary dealing with rivals to supply
unbundled copper loops. 91 The Supreme Court emphasized in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, that antitrust law
86. 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
87. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1077
(2007).
88. Based on the experience of electric utilities that sought merger approvals after
nuclear power plants (long considered to have high operating costs relative to other
generation technologies) increased in value due to rising fossil fuel prices, the ILEC seeking
to decommission valuable copper loops would be more likely to face the threat of regulatory
holdup; regulators would attempt to expropriate for retail customers some portion of the
exogenous increase in the value of the copper loops by threatening to oppose the ILEC's
notice of decommissioning. See Paul W. MacAvoy & J. Gregory Sidak, The Efficient
Allocation of Proceedsfrom a Utility's Sale of Assets, 22 ENERGY L.J. 233 (2001).
89. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
90. Id. at 608.
91. Id.; see also Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004) ("The Court [in Aspen] found significance in the defendant's decision to cease
participation in a cooperative venture. The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus
presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term
profits to achieve an anticompetitive end." (internal citation omitted)).
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permits a monopolist to make investments without imposing an obligation
to share the fruits of those investments. 92 An ILEC's refusal to continue to
operate decommissioned copper loops, therefore, would not constitute
anticompetitive conduct necessary for a finding of liability under section 2
of the Sherman Act. As Judge Posner stressed in his opinion for the
Seventh Circuit in Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,93 a firm's attempt to exit a market fundamentally differs
from an attempt to monopolize one. One can make a similar argument that
the retirement of an asset that a firm no longer needs to produce a product
differs from an attempt to monopolize a downstream market in which the
firm competes by refusing to sell access to an essential upstream input to
competitors. Antitrust law generally imposes negative obligations on a
monopolist-not affirmative obligations-such that "a firm with lawful
monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors, whether by
holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its
competitive punches." 94 Similarly, when it decommissions copper loops, an
ILEC does not act in a predatory fashion but is instead transitioning from
an inferior technology to a superior one that is needed to respond to the
competitive product offerings of its rivals.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulators have set prices for unbundled network elements on the
basis of total element long-run incremental cost, which in turn is calculated
using engineering cost models that require detailed estimates of the
equipment and installation prices of the numerous components that are
used in a telecommunications network. When there is uncertainty about
how these prices will change over the period for which costs and prices are
required, the resulting cost estimates used for setting the regulated prices of
unbundled network elements can be very inaccurate. Similarly, when
regulators in other jurisdictions are considering such rates as
"benchmarks," it is necessary to make adjustments to account for such
large differences in critical input prices, so that the benchmark rates will be
representative of the costs that will be incurred by efficient carriers offering
unbundled elements in those jurisdictions.
The precipitous rise in the price of copper since 2003 exemplifies this
need to reevaluate the inputs used by regulators in their cost model as well
as the inferences drawn from those models. The global financial crisis did
not eliminate this concern, as copper prices in late 2008 were still roughly
twice the 2003 level. Accounting for such evidence of the actual market
92. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
93. 797 F.2d 370, 373-77 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
94. Id.at 375.
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price of copper would change the forward-looking costs of a hypothetically
efficient ILEC network that one of the most prominent U.S. state regulatory
commissions-the California Public Utilities Commission-established in
2006. Similarly, in 2007, New Zealand's Commerce Commission
employed a benchmarking methodology for the pricing of unbundled loops
that failed to account for the increased price of copper. For the input
requirements of their own forward-looking cost models to be satisfied and
economically proper network element prices to be attained, it is important
for regulators to resist the opportunistic policy of employing forwardlooking costs only when doing so produces lower regulated prices over
time.
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